How Apple Gets Security Wrong

NOTE: Much of this is older analysis and some is addressed by Developer Mode and Lockdown mode in iOS 16

• Undocumented protocols (USB-PD, lightning, UTDM, usbmux, IPSW, etc)
• Use of MFi to prevent research and disclosure
• Lack of Physical Attestation for privileged operations
• Hold a key to enable auto-DFU
• DFU on modern iPad / iPhone cumbersome and unreliable
• No audit of SecureBoot source code
• This should be open source
• Lack of critical security indicators (SecureBoot off, upgrade vs erase)
• ChromeBook in insecure mode graphic
• No indicator of a restore vs a upgrade / revive
• Can cary forward malware on the mutable data partition
• Lack of adequate settings (disable BootCamp, Microsoft keys)
• By allowing BootCamp in full all Microsoft bugs are also Apple bugs
• Disable magic-pairing
• Debug protocols in production products
• Bonobo cable
• T2 SWD + Intel DCI
• No system in place to detect modifications (Configurator Verify mode)
• Assume that security will not be circumvented
• No indicator of pairing records in macOS / iOS
• Extracting non-user data isn’t a privacy concern
• Extracting user data with permission (PIN etc) is not a concern
• Forensic boot image
• No audit trail for online accounts
• Device removed / added to FindMy
• Logins
• Active sessions
• Device restored
• 2Fa requests and approvals
• iMessage activations
• SIM card swaps / eSIM operations
• ApplePay enroll / disenrollment
• Pairing records
• iCloud restores